Plato's Laches, the dialogue devoted to the discovery of courage, is generally considered a failure, as the interlocutors' various definitions ultimately prove insufficient. Laches, however, notes that a definition of this kind can only be assessed by considering whether the speaker's words and deeds are in harmony. In fact he goes one step further, and admits that deeds are far more persuasive than words. He therefore declares that he is willing to let Socrates, whose deeds on the battlefield speak volumes, (...) say whatever he pleases. Although himself content to deal with words, Socrates is well aware that, as far as others are concerned, Laches is right. During his defence, for example, Socrates proposes to convince the jury that he is not afraid of death by offering them 'great proofs'; not words, but what they value, namely deeds. On his final day, having undergone a lengthy and complex attempt to persuade his friends that death is nothing to be afraid of, Socrates leaves them with a deed attuned to his word, and thus becomes, in Nietzsche's words, 'the emblem . . . above the entrance gate of science'. (shrink)

The unauthorized 1650 publication of The Elements of Law broke Hobbes’s treatise into two parts that were inconsistent with his own division of the work. This obscured what is arguably the most important insight into Hobbes’s method: his account of how human beings use language to instigate and appease others. I review the evidence of how the publication history of the Elements resulted in a break between I.13 and I.14 that Hobbes did not intend. I then argue that as the (...) description of the very method that Hobbes was using to counteract dangerous dogmatists and appease his fellow citizens, the discussion in question made sense in a work intended for private circulation but not in treatises to be read by those on whom the method was to be applied. I show how reading I.13 and I.14 together, as Hobbes had intended, shows that Hobbes never changed his mind about rhetoric. (shrink)

Book I of Plato's Republic is unusually eventful, yet one episode stands out: Socrates' exchange with Thrasymachus. Thrasymachus' challenge raises a hurdle that Socrates must overcome if he is to convince the audience -- both those present and those reading his account of the discussion -- that, despite plenty of evidence to the contrary, might does not make right. That challenge, however, puts Socrates in the awkward position of having to prove Thrasymachus wrong without appearing to overpower him in the (...) argument and thereby inadvertently proving his opponent's point. Socrates thus allows Thrasymachus to take the reins of the inquiry, only to overthrow and replace him. Once in charge, however, Socrates admits that his own rule over the inquiry ended in an injustice. Socrates' surprising admission signals that his demonstration was necessary to clear the ground for the discovery of justice. His power struggle with Thrasymachus thus renders Book I an indispensable part of the Republic, and foreshadows the interlocutors' troubling realization that justice and power are ultimately impossible to reconcile fully. (shrink)

Commentators have found Hobbes's translation of Thucydides? history puzzling. It was Hobbes's first publication and it preceded his earliest political treatise by more than a decade. Although towards the end of his life Hobbes himself claimed that he published it in order to warn his compatriots of the dangers of democracy and demagoguery, some commentators have dismissed his explanation as an attempt to tie it to his own political theory, in hindsight. Through an examination of Hobbes's preface and essay on (...) the life and history of Thucydides, published alongside his translation, this paper shows that Hobbes's view of Thucydides and his usefulness remained consistent throughout. Siding with Plutarch, Hobbes valued Thucydides for his ability to turn the auditor into a spectator, thereby protecting him, as far as possible, from the dangers of demagoguery. (shrink)